We give an elementary proof of a conjecture by Hegselmann and Krause in opinion dynamics, concerning a symmetric bounded confidence interval model: If there is a truth and all individuals take each other seriously by a positive amount bounded away from zero, then all truth seekers will converge to the truth. Here truth seekers are the individuals which are attracted by the truth by a positive amount. In the absence of truth seekers it was already shown by Hegselmann and Krause that the opinions of the individuals converge.
Introduction
We answer in the affirmative a conjecture posed by Hegselmann and Krause about the long-term behavior of opinions in a finite group of individuals, some of them attracted to the truth, the so-called truth seekers. Our contribution: Under mild assumptions, the opinions of all truth seekers converge to the truth, despite being distracted by individuals not attracted to the truth, the ignorants.
The underlying model for opinion dynamics is the bounded-confidence model : Opinions, which themselves are represented by real numbers in the unit interval, are influenced by the opinions of others by means of averaging, but only if not too far away. This bounded-confidence model (formal example: find a suitable Lyapunov function. The examples we give as we go along in the proof, however, indicate that a certain amount of complexity has to be captured by the arguments because the line between true and false conjectures is extremely thin.
Formal problem statement
Suppose there is a set [n] := {1, . . . , n} of individuals with opinions x i (t) ∈ [0, 1] at time t for all i ∈ [n], t ∈ N. The abstract truth is modeled as a constant over time, denoted by h ∈ [0, 1]. The opinion of an individual i ∈ [n] is influenced in a time step t only by those individuals which have a similar opinion, more precisely which have an opinion in the confidence interval of x i (t).
Definition 1 For x ∈ [0, 1] and a parameter ε ≥ 0 we define the confidence set of value x at time t as I ε x (t) := {j ∈ [n] | |x − x j (t)| ≤ ε}.
As a shorthand we define I ε i (t) := I ε x i (t) (t) for any i ∈ [n].
The update of the opinions is modeled as a weighted arithmetic mean of opinions in the confidence set and a possible attraction towards the truth.
Definition 2 A weighted arithmetic mean symmetric bounded confidence opinion system (WASBOCOS) is a tupel (n, h, ε, α, β; α i (t), β ij (t), x i (0)), where
• n ∈ N ist the number of individuals,
• h ∈ [0, 1] ist the truth,
• ε ∈ [0, 1] is the bounded confidence radius,
• α ∈ (0, 1] is a lower bound for the weight of the truth for truth seekers,
• β ∈ (0, 1 2 ] is a lower bound for the weight of opinions in the bounded confidence interval,
• α i (t) ∈ [α, 1] or α i (t) = 0 for all t ∈ N is the actual weight of the truth for truth seeker i at time step t,
and for all t ∈ N is the weight of opinion j in the view of agent i,
is the starting opinion of Individual i.
The bounded confidence dynamics on such a system is defined by simultaneous updates of the opinions in the following form:
Individuals are members of the index set [n]. Truth seekers are members of the set K := {k ∈ [n] | α k (t) ≥ α ∀t ∈ N}. All other individuals, i.e., those with α i (t) = 0 for all t, are called ignorants; their set is denoted by K.
See Figure 2 for a sketch of a typical set of trajectories. Remark: The term symmetric in the notion of a (WASBOCOS) refers to the confidence radius, not to the weights that individuals assign to other individuals' opinions. The main result we wish to prove is the following: Theorem 1 (Generalized Hegselmann-Krause Conjecture) All truth seekers in an (WASBOCOS) Ω converge to the truth h. Formally, for each γ > 0 and each Ω there exists a T (γ, Ω) so that we have |x k (t) − h| < γ for all k ∈ K and all t ≥ T (γ, Ω).
Note that we use γ > 0 in the statement of convergence instead of ε > 0 because ε is traditionally used for the bounded confidence radius.
It is important that convergence is not just implied by the contraction property of the dynamics with ignorants ignored. Ignorants and where their opinions are make a huge difference (see Figure 1 for an example).
It would be nice if one could derive a bound on the speed of convergence, i.e., a bound on T (γ, Ω), in terms of the structural parameters ε, α, β, and n. Unfortunately, this is not possible. The speed of convergence is not determined by the structural parameters alone. This can be seen in the following simple example. The only truth seeker is located at the bottom on the truth; it gets attracted away from the truth for quite some time; eventually, the ignorants either are "converted" or left behind. Thus, we cannot expect monotone convergence of the truth seeker farthest from the truth, i.p, reaching the truth once does not imply convergence to the truth.
Example 1 Consider a (WASBOCOS) with truth
Then by induction we have x 1 (t) = ε + (1 − α) t ε and x 2 (t) = x 2 (0) =ε for all t ≤ T . So truth seeker 1 seems to monotonically converge to the truth, but at time T + 1 we have Figure 2 for a sketch of the situation. Since we may chooseε arbitrarily small, we find the following: in general, we can not expect that for every γ > 0 there is a T (γ, ε, α, β, n) such that for all t ≥ T (γ, ε, α, β, n) we have |x k (t) − h| < γ for each truth seeker k ∈ K. But we may have interrupted convergence: In a first phase, the truth seekers come arbitrarily close to the truth in time only dependent on the structural parameters; then, they may temporarily get distracted at some point; finally, they converge to the truth in time depending only on the structural parameters and the time of distraction. This can be formalized as follows:
Definition 3 Given ε, α, β, n, we say that truth seekers k ∈ K are (1-fold) interrupted convergent to the truth, if for each γ > 0 there exist two functions T s 1 (γ, ε, α, β, n) and T s 2 (γ, ε, α, β, n, T e 1 ), so that for each (WAS-BOCOS) Ω, with structural parameters ε, α, β and n, there exists an T e 1 ∈ N satisfying
Theorem 1 is now a corollary of the following substantially strengthened Theorem: Figure 2 : A sketch of interrupted convergence: a lonely truth seeker starting at 2ε seems to monotonically converge to the truth right away, but suddenly its confidence interval picks up the ignorant on the other side of the truth, and the truth seeker gets distracted. However, finally the ignorant gets distracted himself, and convergence is eventually established.
Theorem 2 All truth seekers in an (WASBOCOS) Ω are (1-fold) interrupted convergent to the truth.
Originally Hegselmann and Krause considered the (WASBOCOS) model for α i (t) ∈ {0, α} and β ij (t) = 1 n . In the case of complete absence of truth seekers they have already proved, that the opinion of each individual converges, as can be expected, not necessarily to the truth. In fact in general the individuals form several clusters, where two individuals of different clusters converge to different opinions.
We give an example without truth seekers where the individuals will converge to five different clusters.
Example 2 Consider a (WASBOCOS) with α i (t) = 0 (no truth seekers), β = β ij (t) = 1 n , n = 12; the values of α and h do not matter. The starting positions are given by
x 8 (0) = 5ε, x 9 (0) = 6ε, x 10 (0) = 7ε, and x 11 (0) = x 12 (0) = 8ε, see Figure 3 .
In Table 1 we give the complete dynamics of the opinions of all 12 individuals over time until the opinion of every individual has converged. For brevity we write x i instead of x i (t). After three time steps, see Figure 4 for the dynamics, we have reached a stable state, see Figure 5 for the resulting positions of the individuals. 
x 10 x 11 = x 12 0 0ε 1ε 2ε 3ε 4ε 5ε 6ε 7ε 8ε We remark that for symmetric weights β ij (t) = β ji (t) one can easily show that in the absence of truth seekers the dynamics becomes stable after a finite number of time steps. In the case of asymmetric weights β ij (t) = β ji (t) we only have convergence, but need not reach a stable state after an arbitrary, problem dependent, but finite number of time steps, as illustrated in the following example.
Example 3 Consider a (WASBOCOS) with α i (t) = 0 (no truth seekers), n = 2,
; the values of α and h do not matter. One can easily verify, e.g., by induction, that we have All stated insights with the absence of truth seekers were known so far. It becomes a bit more interesting if we allow truth seekers, i.e., if we consider a general (WASBOCOS).
Example 4 Consider a (WASBOCOS) with
ε, x 1 (0) = 0, and x i (0) = ε for i = 1. The opinion u t of the truth seeker 1 at time t and the opinion v t of the other ignorants at time t > 0 are given by
respectively. This can be verified, e.g., by induction. We see that the opinions of the truth seekers, and here also those of the ignorants, converge to the truth h = 1 2 ε. Note the opinions of ignorants may in general fail to converge to the truth as one can see by adding some further ignorants withx i (0) = 3ε.
As our analytical investigation of the previous example was rather technical, we also depict the situation for special values n = 6 and α = 2 3 in Figure 6 . We sketch the truth seeker by a filled circle and the ignorants by an empty circle. 
The crucial objects
To get a first impression of what we may expect in terms of convergence we consider a lonely truth seeker, i.e., n = 1.
Lemma 1 For a lonely truth seeker i = 1 we have
Proof.
Clearly this bound is tight. Similar to this very special situation of a lonely truth seeker is the case ε = 0, so that we now assume ε > 0 for the remaining part of this article.
In order to describe the states of the discrete time dynamical system with more than one truth seeker, we look at the truth seekers with the most extreme opinions.
Definition 4
We defineũ(t) ∈ K as the lexicographically smallest truth seeker which fullfills xũ (t) (t) ≥ h and xũ (t) (t) ≥ x k (t) for all k ∈ K. If there is no truth seeker with opinion greater or equal to the truth h we set u(t) = 0. In order to avoid case distinctions, we define x 0 (t ) := h for all t ∈ N. Similar we definel(t) as the lexicographically smallest truth seeker that fullfills xl (t) (t) ≤ h and xl (t) (t) ≤ x k (t) for all k ∈ K. Again, we set l(t) = 0 if there is no such truth seeker.
Due to the symmetrical -one could say fair -definition of the confidence set, the confidence structure between the individuals can be described as a simple graph with loops.
Definition 5
The confidence graph G(t) with vertex set V (t) and edge set E(t), of a configuration x(t) = (x 1 (t), . . . , x n (t)) ∈ R n and the additional is defined as follows:
For i ∈ V (t) let C i (t) be the set of vertices in the connectivity component of vertex i in G(t).
Because we want to keep track of the individuals which can influence the truth seekers in the future, we give a further definition for individuals, which is similar to Definition 4 for truth seekers.
Definition 6
We defineû(t) ∈ Cũ (t) (t) as the lexicographically smallest individual with xû (t) (t) ≥ x c (t) ∀c ∈ Cũ (t) (t) andl(t) ∈ Cl (t) (t) as the lexicographically smallest individual with xl (t) (t) ≤ x c (t) ∀c ∈ Cl (t) (t) for all t ∈ N.
The opinions ofû(t) andl(t) form an interval [xl (t) (t), xû (t) (t)] called the hope interval which is crucial for our further investigations. To prove the main theorem we will show that the length of this hope interval converges to zero.
In Figure 7 , we have depicted a configuration to illustrate Definition 4 and Definition 6. In particular, we havel = 4,ũ = 9,l = 2, andû = 12. Individual 1 is lost and not contained in the hope interval, because there is no path in G from 1 tol = 4. So we already know that the opinion of Individual 1 will not converge to the truth.
In the configuration depicted in Figure 8 we havel = 2,ũ = 0,l = 2, andû = 5.
Note that the weights β ij may be assymmetric. Thus, the sequence of the opinions of the individuals may reorder during the time steps. As an given by x 1 (1) = 1.985ε, x 2 (1) = 1.015ε, and x 3 (1) = 1.4ε. We remark that it is possible to achieve every ordering of the three opinions in one time step by choosing suitable weights β ij in this example. Nevertheless we have the following straight-forward lemma: Lemma 2 Let i be an ignorant, l ∈ I ε i (t) be an individual with smallest opinion and u ∈ I ε i (t) be an individual with largest opinion then we have
Proof. This follows directly from the system dynamics in Equation (1).
For truth seekers we have a similar lemma:
Lemma 3 Let i be a truth seeker, l ∈ I ε i (t) be an individual with smallest opinion, and let u ∈ I ε i (t) be an individual with largest opinion. For x i (t) ≤ h we have x i (t + 1) ∈ [x l (t), max(h, x u (t))] and for x i (t) ≥ h we have
Our goal is to prove that the length of the hope interval converges to zero. To this end, we show first that the length does not increase after an iteration of Equation (1) .
Lemma 4 For all time steps t ∈ N we have xû (t+1) (t + 1) ≤ xû (t) (t) and xl (t+1) (t + 1) ≥ xl (t) (t).
Proof. We only prove the last inequality since the proof is symmetric for the first inequality. Due to Definition 6, we have xl (t+1) (t + 1) ≤ h and xl (t) (t) ≤ h. By L(t) we denote the set of individuals with opinion strictly smaller than xl (t) (t). That is, L(t ) := {i ∈ [n] | x i (t ) < xl (t ) (t )} for all t ≥ t. We remark that, by definition, L(t ) does not contain a truth seeker. We set U(t ) := [n]\L(t ); this set contains the remaining individuals.
Let u be an individual in L(t) with the largest opinion. By applying Lemma 2 we get x i (t + 1) ≤ x u (t) for all i ∈ L(t). Now let l (e.g., l =l(t)) be an individual in U(t) with smallest opinion then by applying Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 we receive x i (t + 1) ≥ x l (t) for all i ∈ U(t). Thus, we havê l(t + 1) ∈ U(t) and so xl (t+1) (t + 1) ≥ xl (t) (t) follows.
In the remaining part of this article we prove that the length of the hope interval |xû (t) (t) − xl (t) (t)| converges (in some special sense) to zero, as t tends to infinity.
Proof of the Generalized Hegselmann-Krause Conjecture
One difficulty in the proof arises from the fact that convergence happens in two phases: in a first phase, the hope interval becomes sufficiently small so that the confidence graph is the complete graph. Then, it may happen that truth seekers approaching the truth from one side get distracted to the other side of the truth. At that point, however, the confidence structure is so simple that all individuals in the hope interval converge to the truth. Since all truth seekers are in the hope interval at all times, this proves the theorem. Where exactly we split the phases is a technical decisison. First, we show that after a finite number T 1 of time steps, depending only on n, ε, α, and β, the hope interval
]. Therefore, we introduce the following notion.
Definition 7 A good iteration is an iteration where for 1 ≤ r ≤ 3 one of the following conditions is fullfilled:
(1) the number of individuals in the hope interval decreases, (2) the opinion ofl(t + r) reaches or passes h − ε − 
.
Clearly, there is only a finite number of good iterations. We may choose T 1 = 3 · n + 2 · 1 + 2 · 12 εαβ 2 . We formulate the next two lemmas only for the lower bound xl (t) (t) because analog arguments hold for xû (t) (t). As a shorthand we define d(i, j, t) := |x i (t) − x j (t)|. For each point in time t we define the sets
, ε , and
Lemma 5 If M(t) = ∅ then there is a good iteration after 1 step.
Proof. We assume that there is an individual j ∈ M(t), i.e., d(l(t), j, t) ∈ εαβ 12 , ε . For the evaluation of Equation (1) 
for elements of N (t), M(t), or F(t) we do not need to consider the opinion of individuals in [n]\(N (t) ∪ M(t) ∪ F(t)).
Let i be an element of N (t) with opinion x i (t) = xl (t) + δ, where 0 ≤ δ < εαβ 12 . Let us first assume that i is an ignorant. Due to Individual j we have
For a truth seeker we similarly get
Now let i be an element of M(t) ∪ F(t) with x i (t) = xl (t) + δ where δ ≥ εαβ 12 . In any case (i being a truth seeker or an ignorant) we have
individuals with smaller opinion than i
Lemma 6 If xl (t) < h − ε − εαβ 12 then after at least 3 time steps we have a good iteration.
Proof. Due to Lemma 5 we can assume M(t) = M(t + 1) = M(t + 2) = ∅. We can also assume
, and
since otherwise we have a good iteration in at most 2 time steps. At first we claim N (t + 1) ∩ K = ∅. If at time t there is a truth seeker i ∈ N (t) ∩ K then we have
So the only truth seekers that have a chance to move into the set N (t + 1) could be those of the set F(t). So let truth seeker i be in the set F(t) ∩ K, with x i (t) = xl (t) (t) + δ, where ε < δ < ε + 
Similarly, we can deduce N (t + 2) ∩ K = ∅. Now we can assume that the individuals of N (t + 1), who are all ignorants, are in the hope interval at time t + 1, since otherwise we would have a good iteration after 1 time step. So there exist individuals i ∈ N (t + 1) and j ∈ F(t + 1) with |x i (t + 1) − x j (t + 1)| ≤ ε. We set x i (t + 1) = xl (t+1) (t + 1) + δ, where 0 ≤ δ ≤ εαβ 12 and calculate
For the other direction we have
Thus, i ∈ M(t + 2), which results in a good iteration in three time steps.
Thus, we can conclude:
Corollary 1 After a finite number T 1 (ε, n, α, β) of steps we have
Due to Lemma 1 there can not exist a general bound on the convergence that does not depend on α. We consider the two side lengths 2 (t) := |xû (t) (t) − h| and 1 (t) := |xl (t) (t) − h| of the hope interval. Clearly 1 (t) and 2 (t) are not increasing due to Lemma 4. For t ≥ T 1 we have 1 (t), 2 (t) ≤ ε + εαβ 12
Lemma 7 If 1 (t) + 2 (t) ≤ ε then we have
Proof. Let us assume, without loss of generality, that 1 (t) ≥ 2 (t). At first we consider the case 2 (t) > 0. If i is an ignorant with x i (t) = h − 1 (t) + δ then we have
For a truth seeker i with x i (t) = h − 1 (t) + δ we have
Similarly we obtain x i (t + 1) ≤ h + (1 − β) 2 (t) in both cases.
Next we consider the case 1 (t) > 2 (t) = 0 and l i (t + 1) > l i (t) · 1 − α 2 . Let i be an arbitrary truth seeker with opinion x i (t) = h − 1 (t) + δ. We have
Thus, we have
If j is an ignorant with x j (t + 1) = h − 1 (t + 1) + δ, then we have
For an arbitrary truth seeker j we have
Thus, in all cases we have (
This states that once the length of the hope interval becomes at most ε its lengths converges to zero.
Lemma 8 Let t ≥ T 1 . If there exists an individual i with
12 . If there exists an individual i with
Proof. Due to symmetry it suffices to prove the first statement. Let j be an ignorant with x j (t) = h − 1 (t) + δ, where δ ≥ 0. We have
For a truth seeker j with x j (t) = h − 1 (t) + δ, δ ≥ 0 we have
For transparency we introduce the following six sets:
With this the individuals of the hope interval are partitioned into
Lemma 9 If for k ∈ {1, 2} and t ≥ T 1 there exists an ignorant i ∈ N k (t) and an individual j ∈ F k (t) with
12 , then it is easy to check that the influence of Individual j suffices to put ignorant i in set M k (t + 1). In this case we can apply Lemma 8
for k ∈ {1, 2}. Definition 8 Given ε, α, β, n, we say that the truth seekers k ∈ K are r-fold interrupted convergent, if for each γ > 0 there exists r + 1 functions T s i (γ, ε, α, β, n, T e i−1 ), i = 1, . . . , r + 1, so that for each (WASBOCOS) Ω with structural parameters ε, α, β and n there exist T e i ∈ N, i = 1, . . . , r satisfying ∀k ∈ K, ∀t ∈ [T 
Lemma 16
The condition α i (t) = 0 for all i ∈ K is necessary for Theorem 2. If it is dropped then the truth seekers are not (|K| − 1)-fold convergent in general.
Proof. At first we remark that it clearly suffices to have α i (t) = 0 for all i ∈ K only for all t ≥ T , where T is a fix integer. W.l.o.g. we assume T = 0 and consider the following example: h = 1, x i (0) = 1 − 2iε, 1 ∈ K, 1 = i ∈ K, β ij (t) = β, α i (t) = α for the truth seekers, and α i (t) = 0 for the ignorants until we say otherwise. Let there be a given γ > 0 being sufficiently small. There exists a time T 1 until x 1 (T 1 ) < 1 − γ. Up to this time no other individual has changed its opinion. After time T 1 + 1 we suitably choose α 2 (t) so that we have 1 2 ε ≤ x 1 (T 1 ) − x 2 (T 1 ) ≤ ε. So at timeT 1 + 1 the convergence of truth seeker 1 is interrupted the first time. After that we may arrange it that x 1 and x 2 get an equal opinion and will never differ in there opinion in the future. Now there exists a time T 2 until x 2 (T 2 ) = x 1 (T 2 ) < 1 − γ and we may apply our construction described above again. Thus, every ignorant i ∈ K may cause an interruption of the convergence of the truth seekers.
Conjecture 1 If we drop the condition α i (t) = 0 for all i ∈ K in Theorem 2 then we have (|K|)-fold convergence of the truth seekers.
The Hegselmann-Krause Conjecture might be generalized to opinions in R m instead of R when we use a norm instead of | · | in the definition of the update formula. Using our approach to prove this m-dimensional conjecture would become very technical, so new ideas and tools are needed. We give an even stronger conjecture: Conjecture 2 The m-dimensional generalized Hegselmann-Krause Conjecture holds and there exists a function φ(Ω, γ) so that the truth seekers in an arbitrary generalized (WASBOCOS) Ω are φ(Ω, γ)-fold interrupted convergent in ε, α, β, and n.
